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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of the developments in the Korean foreign 
exchange market and the Bank of Korea's foreign exchange interventions since the 
introduction of the floating exchange rate regime in Korea. It deals with institutional 
aspects such as the objectives, instruments employed, tactics and strategies of the 
interventions, as well as the sterilisation practices. It also explains why the Korean 
won has been so volatile during the crisis period, and how the Korean authorities 
have addressed the vulnerability of the won via interventions and other macro-
prudential regulations.  
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1. Introduction 
This note provides an overview of the characteristics of the Korean foreign exchange 
market and the Bank of Korea’s foreign exchange market intervention over the last 
decade. The Korean authorities have intervened in the market when it was judged 
necessary, although we hold the view that under a free floating regime like the 
current Korean exchange rate system the exchange rate should in principle be 
determined in the foreign exchange market, reflecting economic fundamentals. This 
note discusses why and how the Korean authorities intervene in the FX market, and 
describes the consequences of their intervention.  
We once before examined our foreign exchange market developments and FX 
intervention in a BIS country note (2004). Since then, the environment surrounding 
the Korean FX market has changed greatly. Above all, the experience of the global 
financial crisis in 2008 sharply revealed the vulnerabilities of Korea’s foreign 
exchange system to external shock. Therefore, our main policy issues and methods 
of intervention have been modified to cope with the Korean won’s vulnerability. 
Also, therefore, the present note points out what has changed since the last review. 
The rest of the note is organised as follows: As background, section 2 briefly 
describes developments in the foreign exchange market, as well as the institutional 
setup as regards Korean foreign exchange policy. Section 3 goes on to explain the 
objectives and tactics of FX intervention. This is followed in section 4 by a discussion 
of the effectiveness of each intervention channel, and of what happens in the 
domestic financial market after intervention. Section 5 introduces the recent macro-
prudential measures adopted in Korea, and their effects. 
2. Developments in the foreign exchange market after 
adoption of the floating regime 
2.1 Movement of the Korean won 
The USD/KRW exchange rate has for the most part fluctuated in line with global 
financial market circumstances. It has generally shown slow downward trends 
during periods when risk-on sentiments have dominated, owing to the won’s nature 
as a typical risk currency and to Korea’s continuing current account surplus. For 
example, we experienced long-term moderate appreciation of the won in the mid-
2000 decade. However, the exchange rate has shown sharp increases during times 
of market turmoil such as the global financial crisis in 2008 and the European 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and 2011.  
The volatility of the USD/KRW exchange rate has shown similar behaviour. It 
tends to be moderate during periods of risk-on sentiment, and then surges during 
risk-off sentiment. Although these asymmetric features are commonly observed in 
many developing countries that have adopted floats, the Korean won was one of 
the most severe cases during the global financial crisis in 2008 specifically. 
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2.2  Why has the Korean won been so vulnerable? 
Regarding the sharp depreciation and high volatility of the Korean won during past 
financial crises, previous studies usually pointed to Korea’s high degree of capital 
market openness, to its geopolitical risks, and to the large amount of banks’ 
external debt and their maturity mismatches. It is quite obvious that Korea’s high 
capital market openness combined with the pro-cyclicality of international capital 
flows has exposed the country’s foreign exchange market to volatile swings. 
Sporadic geopolitical events reminding investors of the geopolitical risks 
surrounding the Korean Peninsula have also played a part in the won’s vulnerability. 
It might be asked, however, why Korean banks have had large amounts of external 
debt despite the nation’s continuing current account surplus. The answer to this is 
also related to the country’s current account surplus. 
Banks’ external debts have been driven by the demand for FX hedging since the 
mid-2000 decade. Korean exporters and asset management companies have sold 
forward foreign currency to hedge the values of their future export proceeds or 
their foreign-currency-denominated assets. In the years leading up to the global 
financial crisis, bank demands for FX hedging were spearheaded mainly by 
shipbuilders whose overseas orders were increasing thanks to the shipping industry 
boom, and by asset management companies that were rapidly expanding their 
overseas securities investments due to the bullish global stock market and the 
government’s policy of encouraging overseas investment. 
Exports have exceeded imports for several years. Unlike exporters, moreover, 
importers tend to acquire foreign currency in the spot market rather than the 
Movements of Korean won and its volatility Figure 1 
 
1) Implied volatility of 3-month USD/KRW options (data not available before 1999). 
Sources: Bank of Korea; Bloomberg. 
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forward market.2 In the face of companies’ forward selling, and given the shortage 
of forward buying by importers, banks have sought to square their positions by 
taking short positions. This has been done by either borrowing foreign currency 
(typically via foreign bank branches) or creating short FX swap positions (typically a 
domestic bank transaction). After borrowing foreign currency, foreign bank 
branches have exchanged it for Korean wons and invested the proceeds in domestic 
bonds. This is the main reason Korean banks have had such a large amount of 
external debt. 
In addition, banks have built up liquidity mismatches. They raised short-term 
external debt to offset their long-term long positions because of the cheaper 
interest costs of funding and the low perceived liquidity risk, given the abundance 
of global liquidity before the financial crisis. Ree et al. (2012) pointed out that these 
maturity mismatches, combined with the large amount of banks’ external debt, have 
brought about dollar squeezes when crises have occurred, and banks have suddenly 
faced rollover difficulties, forcing them to sell their securities to obtain dollars –  the 
safe haven currency – despite the losses that result. This puts downward pressure on 
the Korean won. The depreciation of the won in turn sends negative signals about 
the Korean economy and can make banks’ FX funding more difficult again. In 
summary, stresses in the on-shore FX funding market and the off-shore FX market 
feed each other. 
Against this background, the foreign exchange authorities in Korea supplied 
dollar funds to banks during the global financial crisis in 2008, and introduced 
macro-prudential measures designed to address banks’ wholesale funding 
problems and reduce their maturity mismatches. 
 
2  Importers in Korea usually feel no need to hedge their foreign exchange risk, as it is relatively easy 
to shift the additional costs onto customers in the domestic market. Hence, they usually participate 
in the spot market or the short-term (less than 2-week) forward market. 
Banks’ typical positioning Figure 2 
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2.3 Institutional setup 
Two administrative bodies are involved in Korean exchange rate intervention: the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and the Bank of Korea (BOK). These two 
institutions serve in partnership as the foreign exchange authorities. The Foreign 
Exchange Transaction Act (FETA) states that the MOSF has overall responsibility for 
the stability of the foreign exchange market and for foreign exchange policy, 
including market intervention. The BOK, under the Bank of Korea Act, also 
formulates foreign exchange policy in cooperation with the government (i.e. the 
MOSF). 
The BOK, as the central bank, manages the nation’s foreign reserves, consisting 
of the Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund and the BOK’s own reserves. The Foreign 
Exchange Stabilisation Fund was established by the Korean government in 1967 and 
has been managed for the purpose of achieving foreign exchange market stability. 
As the legal administrator of the Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund, the MOSF 
makes overall decisions concerning its funding and operation. The operational 
details and ordinary management of the fund, however, are delegated to the 
Governor of the BOK. The BOK, in consultation with the MOSF, is also in charge of 
implementing the actual foreign exchange market interventions. 
3.  Objectives and tactics of foreign exchange intervention  
3.1  Objectives of FX intervention 
The main objective of foreign exchange intervention in Korea is to contain excessive 
exchange rate volatility. Large movements of foreign exchange rates have negative 
effects on a small economy like Korea’s. Excessive exchange rate volatility increases 
economic participants’ uncertainties as to costs and benefits, and thus has potential 
to lead to a decline in the nation’s trade and investment. It is also known that 
inflationary pressures tend to increase when exchange rate volatility goes up, as 
companies facing uncertainties about future prices set product prices higher to 
forestall possible losses. We attempt to limit upward or downward pressures only 
when such pressures cause large volatility in the exchange rate or lead to 
speculative movements. 
Another objective of intervention is to alleviate the FX funding shortages of 
banks, which have experienced severe dollar shortages, especially in periods of 
crisis. As noted above, an FX funding shortage puts depreciatory pressure on the 
Korean won and increases exchange rate volatility. When it is judged necessary, the 
Korean authorities provide dollar liquidity in the FX swap market to ease imbalances 
in the FX funding markets.  
For several years after the currency crisis of 1997, the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves was one of the objectives of intervention. A strong stock of FX 
reserves helps to minimise external vulnerability and to increase confidence in the 
economy. Since a substantial amount of reserves has now been accumulated, 
however, our FX intervention is no longer designed with further accumulation in 
mind.  
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3.2  Basic strategy of FX intervention 
The decision on when and how to intervene in the market depends upon the 
authorities’ discretionary judgment rather than on any implicit rule. Many elements, 
such as the strength and nature of the external shock, the movements of other 
market indices, market sentiment, and the volume of funds available, are all taken 
into account in the discretionary decision-making.  
In determining the timing of intervention, no comprehensive set of indicators is 
adequate in all situations for deciding whether intervention is necessary. Nor is 
there an economic model that reliably integrates all of this information in a form 
that indicates the degree to which intervention is needed. To make such decisions, 
the authorities monitor exchange rate developments and the various related 
conditions on a real-time basis. The conditions considered include, for example, 
fund flows of international investors as well as exporters and importers, liquidity 
conditions in the swap market, market positions, important technical levels, and so 
on. Meanwhile, actual intervention is based on developments at least being 
observed – not pre-emptively before the FX market shows reactions to certain 
events.  
Similar considerations apply to the magnitude of the intervention. The 
domestic financial market situation, as well as the elements mentioned in the 
foregoing paragraph, must be considered when a high-volume intervention is 
carried out, since the domestic money market could be distorted in the sterilisation 
process, hindering the effect of FX intervention. When it comes to limiting excessive 
depreciatory pressures on the Korean won by using the foreign exchange reserves, 
we try to preserve an adequate volume of reserves, since too much of a reduction in 
reserves erodes confidence in the Korean economy, and hence accelerates 
depreciation.  
As to the intervention tools used, direct interventions in both the spot and 
swap markets have been employed. Which instrument the authorities choose 
depends upon the objective of the intervention. Spot market intervention is usually 
preferred when the objective is to contain exchange rate volatility, and swap market 
intervention when the aim is to provide dollar liquidity in the market. The Bank of 
Korea began participating in the FX swap market in September 2007 in order to 
ease imbalances in the country’s FX funding market. During the global financial 
crisis in 2008, the BOK also supplied 10.27 billion dollars to foreign exchange banks 
through swap transactions using a competitive bidding method. The bank at that 
time also provided 16.35 billion dollars through lending transactions, utilising a 
currency swap agreement with the U.S. Federal Reserve. We also use verbal 
intervention to give speculative forces warning by conveying the authorities’ 
concerns and intentions related to foreign exchange market developments. Verbal 
intervention must be used limitedly, as its effects on the market will lessen if it is 
used frequently.  
The Korean FX authorities do not publicly disclose any information related to 
intervention, because we believe that such information could stimulate speculative 
trading in the FX market. We thus intervene in the market through agents selected 
from among major banks. The Bank of Korea imposes a confidentiality requirement 
on these agent banks to maintain secrecy concerning intervention. As for the criteria 
used to select the agent banks, priority is given to institutions with the following 
characteristics: no danger of default risk, ability to provide the Bank of Korea with 
instant market information, and active role in the market. 
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4. Channels of intervention, and domestic consequences 
4.1 Channels of intervention 
Of the various channels for intervention, the signalling channel seems to be 
generally the most effective in Korea, by changing market participants’ expectations 
about future exchange rates and intervention. Through the signalling channel, the 
Korean authorities give speculative forces warning and provide market participants 
an opportunity to rethink whether recent movements in the FX market are rational. 
The portfolio balance channel and the microstructure channel also sometimes work, 
depending upon the situation. The overall effects of intervention through all of 
these channels have become weaker than they were in the past as the size of the 
Korean exchange market has expanded. Meanwhile, there is no room for going 
through the monetary policy channel, because we fully sterilise any changes in the 
domestic money supply brought about by intervention. 
4.2 Sterilisation in Korea 
The Bank of Korea sterilises changes in its domestic money supply brought about by 
FX intervention, using market instruments for the purpose. The major sterilisation 
instrument for the Bank of Korea is issuance or withdrawal of Monetary Stabilisation 
Bonds (MSBs, Korean central bank securities). Deposit to / withdrawal from the 
Monetary Stabilisation Account and transactions in the repo market are also used to 
control short-term money market liquidity. Using MSBs can be a more effective way 
of adjusting changes in the money supply, as the impacts of the other instruments 
tend to reverse after a few days. However, sterilisation using MSBs is more costly, as 
long-term interest rates are usually higher than short-term rates. In cases where the 
government covers the expenses of intervention by using the Foreign Exchange 
Stabilisation Fund, sterilisation by the Bank of Korea using MSBs is not necessarily 
required, since the base money supply does not change.  
4.3 FX intervention and monetary policy 
Along with the change in the exchange rate regime in 1997, inflation targeting was 
chosen as the monetary policy framework to achieve the Bank of Korea’s aim of 
price stabilisation. Given free movement of capital, the Bank of Korea sometimes 
has difficulties in achieving low exchange rate volatility while maintaining stable 
inflation. This is related to the impossible trinity theory argued by Mundell, which 
states that a country cannot simultaneously have perfectly free capital movement, a 
perfectly floating exchange rate and perfectly autonomous monetary policy. A 
recent conflict between FX and monetary policy occurred in mid-2011, when 
inflation rose to 4.7%, exceeding the central bank’s target range (3%±1%), while the 
Korean won was appreciating rapidly and exchange rate volatility was high. There 
was a possibility that a hike in the policy rate could lead to more capital inflows and 
thus accelerate exchange rate volatility. Meanwhile, if the Bank of Korea had tried to 
limit excessive exchange rate volatility by intervention to prevent additional 
appreciation of the won at that time, the action could have hindered the curbing of 
inflation, in that import prices would not have fallen without additional currency 
appreciation.  
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On the other hand, FX market intervention and monetary policy in Korea can 
sometimes be complementary. In the face of huge capital inflows and high inflation, 
for instance, the central bank faces a double bind. If it raises the policy rate to curb 
inflation, capital inflows will be increased. Inflation will, on the other hand, rise if the 
bank cuts the policy rate to limit capital inflows. In this case, intervention to absorb 
foreign currency in the FX market could reduce additional capital inflows without 
the need for a policy rate cut, by stemming the flows due to self-fulfilling 
expectations of currency appreciation, and by reducing deviation from the covered 
interest rate parity. Ostry et al. (2012) have also pointed out that FX intervention in 
certain circumstances may be an optimal instrument even under an inflation 
targeting regime. 
5. Other recent foreign exchange measures and their 
effects 
To fundamentally reduce the vulnerability of the Korean won, the Korean authorities 
have introduced strengthened macro-prudential regulations since 2010, such as 
limiting banks’ foreign currency forward positions, re-introducing a withholding tax 
on foreign purchases of Treasury and Monetary Stabilisation Bonds, and imposing a 
macro-prudential stability levy on banks’ non-deposit FX liabilities. These measures 
are aimed at improving foreign exchange market soundness by addressing banks’ 
FX funding problems and reducing their maturity mismatches.  
Since the adoption of these various measures, Korean banks’ reliance on short-
term FX funding has declined. Banks’ external funding profiles have improved 
considerably, particularly at foreign bank branches whose short-term debt as a 
proportion of total external debt has declined steadily, from more than 90 per cent 
right before introduction of the regulations nearly to 60 per cent at the end of the 
third quarter of 2012. The amount of foreign bank branches’ external debt has also 
decreased somewhat, although that of domestic banks has increased. Fortunately, 
USD/KRW exchange rate volatility has also generally diminished since 2010, despite 
several ups and downs, as banks’ external funding profiles have improved. The 
volatility of the Korean won during the recent European sovereign debt crisis has 
also gradually lessened.  
Have these improvements, then, been attributable to the Korean authorities’ 
introduction of the various new regulations? Even though this is hard to measure, 
we think that the regulations adopted have played a role in improving the banks’ 
external funding profiles, and thus affected the exchange rate volatility. For now, 
therefore, it can be said that these macro-prudential measures have helped to 
reduce the need for direct intervention. 
We must, however, be cautious about jumping to conclusions. The 
improvements might have also come from changes in the environment surrounding 
the Korean FX market. First, the demand for medium- to long-term FX hedging, 
particularly by Korean shipbuilders, has declined in the face of a sharp global drop 
in ship orders. This has helped to reduce the amount of external debt and the 
liquidity mismatches of banks. On the other hand, offshore entities, including real 
money and sovereign investors, are increasingly replacing foreign bank branches as 
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investors in domestic bonds.3 As a result, the government’s long-term external debt, 
which has relatively high solvency, has increased at the same time that banks’ short-
term debt has decreased. In addition, foreign banks and sovereign investors clearly 
have different investment objectives and horizons, and their responses to liquidity 
shocks are hence likely to differ, reducing herding behaviour in the capital markets. 
It seems that all of these changes have contributed to the recent improvement in 
the Korean FX market. Further research is needed to measure how much of the 
improvement has been attributable to the regulations we have adopted, and to 
verify whether the need for direct intervention has ultimately been reduced. 
References 
Ostry, Jonathan D., Ghosh, Atish R. and Chamon, Marcos, 2012, “Two Targets, Two 
Instruments: Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies in Emerging Market Economies”, 
IMF Staff Discussion Notes, no 12/1. 
Ree, Jack Joo K., Yoon, Kyoungsoo and Park, Hail, 2012, “FX Funding Risks and 
Exchange Rate Volatility – Korea’s Case”, IMF Working Paper no 12/268. 
Rhee, Gwang Ju and Lee, Eunmo, 2004, “Foreign Exchange Intervention and Foreign 
Exchange Market Development in Korea”, BIS Paper no 24. 
 
3  The relative dominance of these two groups of investors as net buyers of domestic bonds has 
reversed since late 2009. 
